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THE PROMISE AND SHORTCOMINGS OF PRIVACY 
MULTISTAKEHOLDER POLICYMAKING: A CASE 
STUDY 
Omer Tene and J. Trevor Hughes* 
A: I think the notion of a multistakeholder process was bolstered, not by thinking 
that it will work necessarily, but rather because it’s so easy to call for.  That’s a 
classic line: “we need a dialogue!”  You don’t have to take a position on the issue; 
you don’t have to do anything about an issue to say, “We should talk about it.”  
 
Q: So, it’s basically a cop out? 
 
A: I think that’s right.1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
With formal privacy policymaking processes mired in discord, governments 
and regulators in the United States and Europe have turned to the private sector 
seeking assistance and solutions.  Multistakeholder-driven self-regulation and co-
regulation have been pursued in a variety of contexts ranging from online privacy 
and transparency for mobile applications to protection of transborder data flows.  
This Article focuses on one such process, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) 
discussion of a Do Not Track (DNT) standard, as a case study.2  It critically 
analyzes the procedural pitfalls, which hampered the quest to reach a compromise 
solution acceptable by groups with diametrically opposed interests, including 
industry players, government regulators, and privacy advocates.  It is based on a 
series of interviews that the Authors conducted with participants in the process, 
including leading industry, civil society, and government players.3  
Proponents of multistakeholder processes, including the U.S. government, 
suggest that this mode of policymaking benefits from important advantages, 
including an opportunity to coopt industry experts, move swiftly to conclusion, and 
garner industry support.4  The reality, however, is that the W3C process featured 
                                                                                                     
 * Omer Tene is Vice President of Research and Education and J. Trevor Hughes President and 
CEO of the International Association of Privacy Professionals. The Authors would like to thank 
Jonathan Mayer, Joanne McNabb, John Verdi, and Alexander Hanff, as well as two additional 
interviewees who asked to remain anonymous, for their valuable time and thoughtful insights, and 
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 1. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Mayer, Stanford University graduate student in computer 
science and law, and an invited expert to the W3C process (Dec. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Mayer Interview]. 
 2. See Nick Doty & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Internet Multistakeholder Processes and Techno—Policy 
Standards Initial Reflections on Privacy at the World Wide Web Consortium, 11 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 135 (2013).  
 3. Given that the interviews focused not on substantive issues but rather on the mechanics of the 
process, we allowed some of the interviewees to remain anonymous. We believe that an “off the record” 
discussion better captured their candid criticism and allowed them to speak freely.  
 4. Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and 
Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy, THE WHITE HOUSE 23-27 (Feb. 23, 2012), 
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few of these benefits.  It was protracted, rife with hardball rhetoric and combat 
tactics, based on inconsistent factual claims, and under constant threat of becoming 
practically irrelevant due to lack of industry buy-in.  
Perhaps this should not be surprising.  The way DNT has been framed—as a 
veritable “on/off” switch for an entire industry—inevitably raised the stakes for a 
common accord.5  Indeed, DNT crystallizes a deep ideological divide about right 
and wrong in online behavior, with one side arguing that merely collecting users’ 
information is wrong, and the other side claiming a right—in fact a business 
imperative—to use such information for multiple goals.6  Add to that a healthy 
portion of competitive maneuvering within the industry, and you get a combustive 
mix. 
As the discussions progressed, they became increasingly contentious and 
polarized, with the most extreme voices on either side of the ideological divide 
leading the way.7  Moreover, they were subject to the disruptive force of exogenous 
factors, not the least of which was the unilateral decision by Microsoft, a major 
browser maker, to automatically set DNT on by default.8  This development, in and 
of itself, may very well have been the death knell of an already a stagnant process.   
Critics could argue that self-regulation would be better served without a 
preceding multistakeholder process.  Let the industry devise rules for itself, at most 
soliciting comments from civil society and regulators.  Yet codes of conduct 
drafted by industry for industry are often derided as a self-serving ruse intended to 
avert formal regulation.9  As one privacy advocacy organization notes, “We now 
have repetitive, specific, tangible examples of failed self-regulation in the area of 
privacy.”10  
Others could argue that the W3C was ill-suited in the first place to engage in a 
highly divisive policy debate of this nature.  Primarily a technical standard-setting 
body, W3C, which is run by engineers, was not prepared to resolve policy conflicts 
                                                                                                     
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf [hereinafter White House Privacy 
Framework]. 
 5. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing Transparency and 
Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 281, 334 (2012). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Laura Stampler, Firefox Launches 'Nuclear First Strike Against Ad Industry,' BUS. INSIDER 
(Feb. 25, 2013, 9:36 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/firefox-to-block-third-party-cookies-2013-
2#ixzz2vWG3wFFc.  
 8. Brendon Lynch, Advancing Consumer Trust and Privacy: Internet Explorer in Windows 8, 
MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (May 31, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://blogs.technet.com/b/ 
microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2012/05/31/advancing-consumer-trust-and-privacy-internet-explorer-
in-windows-8.aspx. 
 9. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Privacy Self-Regulation: A Decade of Disappointment, ELEC. PRIVACY 
INFO. CTR. 1 (Mar. 4, 2005), http://epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.pdf; Robert Gellman & Pam 
Dixon, Many Failures: A Brief History of Privacy Self-Regulation in the United States, WORLD 
PRIVACY FORUM 4 (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2011/10/WPFselfregulationhistory.pdf. 
 10. World Privacy Forum, Comments of the World Privacy Forum Regarding the Federal Trade 
Commission Preliminary Staff Report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: A 
Proposed Framework for Business and Policymakers, FED. TRADE COMM’N 3 (Feb. 18, 2011), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/preliminary-ftc-staff-report-
protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-proposed-framework/00376-58005.pdf. 
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among scores of lawyers and government affairs professionals.  Its decision-
making processes were fickle and revolved around a seemingly endless list of 
repetitive, overlapping issues.11  Like Goethe’s Sorcerer's Apprentice,12 the W3C 
experienced every effort to close an issue while simultaneously opening several 
new ones.  It is perhaps telling that after more than two years of discussions, the 
group has not yet been able to define the term “tracking,” the raison d'être for the 
process.13  Rules on representation were vague and included a pay-to-play entry 
barrier that may have skewed the composition of the group towards more 
resourceful stakeholders.14 
Part II of this Article analyzes the difficulties facing formal policymaking 
processes in the field of privacy.  Rapidly evolving technologies, shifting business 
models, and polarized social and cultural norms complicate the quest for a 
simplified privacy policy.  This has led policymakers to turn to the private sector 
for help.  Part III sets forth the opportunities and risks of multistakeholder-driven 
self-regulatory and co-regulatory models.  Part IV of the Article assesses 
multistakeholder processes in practice, focusing on the W3C discussion of DNT as 
a case study.  It shows that, counter to conventional wisdom, a multistakeholder 
process could turn out to be neither faster moving nor more collaborative than top-
down regulation, and may be set for little or no industry adoption even in the 
unlikely case that it is resolved.  The Article does not set out to, nor does it, prove 
that all multistakeholder processes are destined to fail.  Rather, it seeks to draw 
lessons from one particular attempt at multistakeholder policymaking in order to 
help improve new processes down the road.  Part V concludes, setting forth basic 
recommendations for the future. 
II. FORMAL POLICYMAKING  
Policymaking in the field of information privacy has been laden with discord.  
For many years, the United States has been debating the merits, format, and 
sometimes contents of comprehensive privacy legislation,15 yet, there is no end to 
the debate in sight.16  In the European Union, where privacy law is clearly in need 
of reform,17 policymakers are embroiled in what seem to be endless heated 
discussions around the minutia of a 119-page legislative document submitted more 
                                                                                                     
 11. See discussion infra Part IV.A.3. 
 12. JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, THE SORCERER'S APPRENTICE (Edwin Zeydel trans., 1955) 
(1779), available at http://germanstories.vcu.edu/goethe/zauber_e3.html. 
 13. See Issue-5: What is the Definition of Tracking?, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, 
http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/track/issues/5 (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (settling on a 
definition of “tracking” that is dependent on several additional yet-to-be resolved issues, such as an 
explanation of permitted tracking).  
 14. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
 15. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 897-98 
(2003).  
 16. Somini Sengupta, No U.S. Action, So States Move on Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013, 
at A1, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/technology/no-us-action-so-states-move-on-
privacy-law.html. 
 17. See Omer Tene, Privacy Law’s Midlife Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the Second Wave of 
Global Privacy Laws, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1232-34 (2013). 
2014] PRIVACY MULTISTAKEHOLDER POLICYMAKING 441 
than two years ago by the European Commission.18  The embattled legislative 
process periodically flares into mutual recriminations between European 
institutions and sometimes even national strife.19   
Perhaps this should come as no surprise, given that even the basic tenets of 
privacy law are rife with ambiguity.  For more than a century, scholars and jurists 
have vigorously argued over the definition of privacy,20 and notwithstanding 
several compelling theories, the discussion continues unabated today.  The framing 
of other foundational terms remains similarly elusive.  Even where plaintiffs prove 
the elements of a privacy cause of action, they often run into difficulty when asked 
to show harm,21 given the lack of legal consensus over whether privacy harms are 
legally cognizable.22  Personally identifiable information, the most basic building 
block of an information privacy framework, remains one of the most contentious 
concepts in privacy, igniting frequent disputes between engineers and lawyers 
involving science, philosophy, and a healthy dosage of political spin.23  Another 
charged concept is that of consent, a veritable trump card in privacy interactions, 
abused almost as often as it is used, and meaning dramatically different things to 
different people, companies, and regulators.24  
Privacy is highly culturally dependent, stoking persistent discord between 
Europe and the U.S.25  Despite some convergence around high-level principles 
known as the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs),26 there continues to be 
significant disharmony with respect to the general place of information privacy in 
                                                                                                     
 18. Christopher Kuner, Cédric Burton, & Anna Pateraki, The Proposed EU Data Protection 
Regulation Two Years Later, BNA PRIVACY & SEC. L. REP. 1-2 (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.wsgr.com/eudataregulation/pdf/kuner-010614.pdf. 
 19. See, e.g., Kelly Fiveash, EU Legal Eagle Legal: Data Protection Reforms 'Very Bad Outcome' 
for Citizens, THE REGISTER, Dec. 9, 2013, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/12/09/ 
eu_data_protection_reforms_hits_legal_roadblock; EU To Push Ahead On Data Protection Despite UK 
Opposition, EURACTIV.COM, Oct. 28, 2013, http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-digital-single-
mar/commission-push-ahead-data-prote-news-531357. 
 20. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of 
Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006); HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, 
POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 2 (2010); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 1904 (2013). 
 21. M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1132 (2011). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of 
Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1816 (2011); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises 
of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 
(2010). 
 24. Omer Tene & Christopher Wolf, The Draft EU General Data Protection Regulation: Costs and 
Paradoxes of Explicit Consent (Future of Privacy Forum White Paper, Jan. 2013), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/121642539/The-Draft-EU-General-Data-Protection-Regulation-Costs-and-
Paradoxes-of-Explicit-Consent. 
 25. Omer Tene, Privacy in Europe and the United States: I Know It When I See It, CTR. FOR 
DEMOCRACY & TECH. BLOG (June 27, 2011), https://cdt.org/blogs/privacy-europe-and-united-states-i-
know-it-when-i-see-it. 
 26. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After the 
OECD Privacy Guidelines, in THE OECD PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 70-71 (July 11, 2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf.  
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law.27  At the risk of oversimplification, Europeans view information privacy as a 
fundamental human right, whereas the U.S. treats it as a matter of tort law and 
consumer protection.28  At the same time, the parties to the cross-Atlantic 
discussion often seem to be talking past each other.  For example, while Europe 
waves the “fundamental right” flag as it depicts U.S. privacy law as “inadequate,” 
Europeans sometimes forget that privacy is a constitutional right in the U.S., 
protected by the Fourth Amendment as well as through “penumbras of privacy” in 
the Constitution.29  And while Americans tend to portray the European framework 
as bureaucratic and overly prescriptive, it is often U.S. law with its layers upon 
layers of federal and state statutes, regulatory and individual enforcement, that is 
daunting to operationalize.30  
The heart of the matter is that privacy raises genuine dilemmas and thorny 
legal questions.  First, it consistently collides with other constitutional rights and 
weighty policy interests.  For example, privacy often restricts freedom of speech, 
the cornerstone of constitutional liberties in the U.S. and a forceful fundamental 
right in Europe.31  Similarly, it often conflicts with the interests of national security 
and law enforcement agencies, which seek to collect as much information as 
possible in their intelligence gathering and enforcement operations.32  An obstacle 
to the free flow of information, privacy is anathema to free market theorists like 
Richard Posner, who pronounced it overrated, dangerous, and “really just a 
euphemism for concealment, for hiding specific things about ourselves from 
others.”33  
Second, the formation of a coherent privacy policy is impeded by the lightning 
speed of innovation in the technology industry.  The surge in technological 
developments makes privacy policymaking a moving target.34  Consider the 
laborious process in Europe for amending the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Directive, colloquially known as the “Cookie Directive.”35  By the time the 
legislation, which requires users’ opt-in consent for website cookie use,36 was 
passed, the technological landscape shifted to supplant cookies with server-side 
tracking alternatives and embedded device identifiers.37  
                                                                                                     
 27. See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy in Europe: Initial Data 
on Governance Choices and Corporate Practices, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1529 (2013).  
 28. See id. at 1539-47.  
 29. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
 30. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 23, at 1872-77. 
 31. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011); Campbell v. MGN Ltd., 
[2004] UKHL 22 [12] (U.K.); Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2), 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 228, ¶ 69.  
 32. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Cyberthreat, Government Network Operations, and the Fourth 
Amendment, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 47, 57-60 (Jeffrey Rosen 
& Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011).  
 33. Richard A. Posner, Privacy is Overrated, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 28, 2013, 4:19 AM, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/privacy-overrated-article-1.1328656. 
 34. See generally, Omer Tene, Privacy Law’s Midlife Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the Second 
Wave of Global Privacy Laws, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217 (2013). 
 35. Council Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11 (EC). 
 36. Id. art. 2, §§ (5)-(6). 
 37. Kelsey Finch, Cookie Monsters of Silicon Valley Come to Brussels, IAPP: THE PRIVACY 
ADVISOR, Nov. 25, 2013, 
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Third, the social norms underlying privacy policy are in constant flux.  With 
technological innovation rapidly driving new models for business and inviting new 
types of socialization, policymakers often have nothing more than fleeting 
intuitions as to what is right or wrong.38  As new technologies strain our social 
norms, a shared understanding of privacy etiquette becomes even more difficult to 
capture.39  Yet for businesses that make money by leveraging newly available data 
sources, it is critical to operationalize these subjective notions into coherent 
business and policy strategies.  This, in turn, exerts more pressure on policymakers 
to deliver results expeditiously.  
III. MULTISTAKEHOLDER POLICYMAKING: A PROMISING PATH? 
Against this backdrop, it is clear why governments and legislatures have 
coopted the public for assistance in the policymaking process.  The U.S. has 
engaged the private sector in self-regulatory efforts for more than a decade, 
culminating in the Obama administration’s call for a structured set of 
multistakeholder processes as a pillar of its privacy strategy.40  As one 
commentator notes, “[The FTC and DOC] argue that self-regulation can protect 
privacy in a more flexible and cost-effective manner than direct regulation without 
impeding the rapid pace of innovation in Internet-related businesses.”41 
Proponents of multistakeholder self-regulatory and co-regulatory solutions 
suggest that these modes of policymaking benefit from distinct advantages vis-à-vis 
the legislative process.42  They argue that these collaborative mechanisms tap into 
industry knowledge and expertise, producing more practical and effective rules,43 
can produce solutions in a more timely fashion than formal regulatory processes,44 
and are more likely to rally industry support and adoption than top-down 
regulation.45  Critics argue that privacy self-regulation reflects industry subterfuge 
intended to avert (or at the very least delay) regulation,46 tends to be overly lax and 
                                                                                                     
https://www.privacyassociation.org/publications/cookie_monsters_of_silicon_valley_come_ 
to_brussels.  
 38. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shifting Social 
Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2) (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2326830). 
 39. Id. 
 40. White House Privacy Framework, supra note 4. 
 41. Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, 6 
ISJLP 355, 356 (2011). 
 42. Dennis D. Hirsch, In Search of the Holy Grail: Achieving Global Privacy Rules Through 
Sector-Based Codes of Conduct, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1029, 1041-42 (2013) (citing Neil Gunningham & 
Joseph Rees, Industry Self-regulation: An Institutional Perspective, 19 L. & POL’Y 363, 366 (1997)); see 
Rubinstein, supra note 41, at 357-58; Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative 
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (1997).  
 43. Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1041-42. 
 44. White House Privacy Framework, supra note 4, at 23. 
 45. Hirsch, supra note 43, at 1041-42; Dennis D. Hirsch, Going Dutch? Collaborative Dutch 
Privacy Regulation and the Lessons It Holds for U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 83, 104. 
 46. Hoofnagle, supra note 9, at 5; Gellman & Dixon, supra note 9, at 25.  Hirsch points out that 
unlike self-regulation, co-regulation is less amenable to industry capture given the involvement of 
government and regulators.  Hirsch, supra note 43, at 1045-46.  
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serve a public relations rather than a regulatory function,47 and has a poor track 
record for compliance and enforcement.48 
A. FTC Support  
In July 1999, the FTC issued a report to Congress titled “Self-Regulation and 
Online Privacy,” in which it stated that legislation to address online privacy was 
inappropriate in the face of industry efforts to self-regulate.49  In evaluating the 
state of online privacy self-regulation, the report stressed that “self-regulation is the 
least intrusive and most efficient means to ensure fair information practices, given 
the rapidly evolving nature of the Internet and computer technology.”50  The FTC 
report and preceding consultations spawned a number of self-regulatory efforts, 
including the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) and the BBBOnline Privacy 
Program, a subsidiary of the Council of Better Business Bureaus.51 
Over the years, the FTC’s support for and interest in a self-regulatory privacy 
framework has waxed and waned.52  In 2010, as privacy in online behavioral 
                                                                                                     
 47. COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 154 (2006). 
 48. Hirsch, supra note 43, at 1043; Gellman & Dixon, supra note 9, at 4, 6, 9. 
 49. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, “Self-Regulation and Privacy Online,” FTC Report to 
Congress (July 13, 1999) (available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1999/07/self-
regulation-and-privacy-online-ftc-report-congress); see Self-Regulation and Privacy Online: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Commc’ns of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 106th Cong. 4-5 
(1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-
statement-federal-trade-commission-self-regulation-and-privacy-online/privacyonlinetestimony.pdf 
(prepared statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairmain, Fed. Trade Comm'n). 
 50. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 49. 
 51.  See ROBERT GELLMAN & PAM DIXON, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, MANY FAILURES: A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF PRIVACY SELF-REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 7-8 (Oct. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/WPFselfregulationhistory.pdf.  For 
information on how these programs have evolved, see BBB EU Safe Harbor Program, COUNCIL FOR 
BETTER BUS. BUREAUS, http://www.bbb.org/council/eusafeharbor (last visited Apr. 21, 2014); NAI 
Code Enforcement, NETWORK ADVER. INITIATIVE, http://www.networkadvertising.org/code-
enforcement (last visited Apr. 21, 2014). 
 52.For example, just a year after its 1999 report advocating self-regulation and legislative restraint, 
the FTC reported to Congress that, although there had been improvement in industry self-regulatory 
efforts, the robustness of these processes was unsatisfactory.  Privacy Online: Fair Information 
Practices in the Electronic Marketplace, a Report to Congress, FED. TRADE COMM’N ii (May 2000), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-
electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000text.pdf.  Accordingly, a majority 
of the commissioners concluded that it was time for legislation requiring online businesses to comply 
with the FIPPs.  Id. at 36-38.  In December 2007, following a “Behavioral Advertising Town Hall” that 
led to a public discussion about the need to address privacy concerns in this area, the FTC issued for 
public comment a set of proposed principles to encourage and guide industry self-regulation.  Press 
Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Revises Online Behavioral Advertising Principles (Feb. 12, 
2009) (available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2009/02/ftc-staff-revises-online-
behavioral-advertising-principles).  In 2009, the FTC issued a report, titled “Self-Regulatory Principles 
for Online Behavioral Advertising,” setting forth revisions to proposed principles to govern self-
regulatory efforts in this area.  FTC Staff Report: Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral 
Advertising, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/ 
federal-trade-commission-staff-report-self-regulatory-principles-online-behavioral-advertising/ 
p085400behavadreport.pdf.  Commissioner Jon Leibowitz issued a separate concurring statement 
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advertising remerged as a primary item on the FTC’s agenda, self-regulation was 
once again put forth as a possible solution.53  To be sure, the FTC stated in its 
Preliminary Staff Report that “industry efforts to address privacy through self-
regulation have been too slow, and up to now have failed to provide adequate and 
meaningful protection.”54  Yet, it also it made clear that it “supports a more 
uniform and comprehensive consumer choice mechanism for online behavioral 
advertising, sometimes referred to as ‘Do Not Track’,” adding that “[s]uch a 
universal mechanism could be accomplished by legislation or potentially through 
robust, enforceable self-regulation.”55 
In its final report, issued in 2012, the FTC noted that “industry has made 
significant progress in implementing Do Not Track,” referring to tools developed 
by browser vendors and commitments undertaken by the Digital Advertising 
Alliance (DAA), a broad coalition of industry groups.56  Yet, the FTC particularly 
emphasized the work done by the W3C Tracking Protection Working Group (the 
“Working Group”), noting that “[t]he W3C group has made substantial progress 
toward a standard that is workable in the desktop and mobile settings.”57  Stressing 
the multistakeholder nature of this effort, the FTC elaborated that “the W3C 
Internet standards-setting body has gathered a broad range of stakeholders to create 
an international, industry-wide standard for Do Not Track.  The Working Group 
includes a wide variety of stakeholders, including DAA members; other U.S. 
companies; international companies; industry groups; and public-interest groups.”58  
Suffice it to say that, as further discussed infra, the W3C process failed to deliver 
on its promise. 
                                                                                                     
attached to the report, noting, “I write separately to ensure that the Report’s endorsement of self-
regulation is viewed neither as a regulatory retreat by the Agency nor an imprimatur for current business 
practice.”  FTC Staff Report: Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising, Concurring 
Statement of FTC Comm’r Jon Leibowitz, FED. TRADE COMM’N 1 (Feb. 2009), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/concurring-statement-commissioner-
jon-leibowitz-ftc-staff-report-self-regulatory-principles-online/p085400behavadleibowitz.pdf.  He also 
states, “Industry needs to do a better job of meaningful, rigorous self-regulation or it will certainly invite 
legislation by Congress and a more regulatory approach by our Commission.  Put simply, this could be 
the last clear chance to show that self-regulation can – and will – effectively protect consumers’ privacy 
in a dynamic online marketplace.”  Id.  This report, too, prompted the industry to launch a number of 
self-regulatory initiatives, including the development of new codes of conduct and online tools to allow 
consumers more control over the receipt of targeted advertising.  See DAA Announces Guidance for 
Self-Reg Principles in Mobile Environment, DIGITAL ADVER. ALLIANCE, http://www.aboutads.info (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2014). 
 53. Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: A Proposed Framework for 
Businesses and Policymakers, Preliminary FTC Staff Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N iii (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-consumer-
protection-preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protecting-consumer/101201privacyreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC 
Staff Report]; see also DIGITAL ADVER. ALLIANCE, supra note 52. 
 54. FTC Staff Report, supra note 53. 
 55. Id. at 66. 
 56. Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and 
Policymakers, FED. TRADE COMM’N 13 (Mar. 2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-
consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
 57. Id. at 5. 
 58. Id. at 54.  
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B. Department of Commerce Support 
Not only the FTC, but also the U.S. Department of Commerce, has actively 
promoted multistakeholder policymaking.  In its main policy statement on privacy 
to date, the Obama administration increased its reliance on the success of 
multistakeholder-generated enforceable codes of conduct.59  The administration 
promoted: a statutory consumer privacy bill of rights,60 which has yet to materialize 
and many doubt that it will;61 strengthening FTC enforcement,62 which similarly 
hinges on legislation; and improving global interoperability,63 which is a lofty goal, 
albeit without a clear success matrix.  Hence, fostering multistakeholder processes 
to develop enforceable codes of conduct remains the main actionable item in the 
administration’s strategy. 
The administration promised to “convene open, transparent forums in which 
stakeholders who share an interest in specific markets or business contexts will 
work toward consensus on appropriate, legally enforceable codes of conduct.”64  It 
encouraged all relevant parties to engage, including “individual companies, 
industry groups, privacy advocates, consumer groups, crime victims, academics, 
international partners, State Attorneys General, [and] Federal civil and criminal law 
enforcement representatives.”65  Citing the success of Internet standard setting 
bodies, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and W3C, as well as 
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a nonprofit 
corporation that coordinates the technical management of the domain name system, 
the administration posited that multistakeholder processes underlie many of the 
institutions responsible for the Internet’s success.66  It believed that 
multistakeholder processes could achieve results with more flexibility, speed, and 
decentralization than formal regulatory processes.67 
The administration tasked the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA), a Department of Commerce agency responsible for 
advising the President on telecommunications and information policy issues, with 
convening and facilitating the discussion.68  However, the administration did not 
envisage the NTIA as a decision-maker, stating that the “NTIA’s role will be to 
help the parties reach clarity on what their positions are and whether there are 
options for compromise toward consensus, rather than substituting its own 
judgment.”69  Recognizing that a consensus rule can reward intransigence, the 
administration proposed that “the parties should discuss and set out rules or 
procedures at the outset of the process to govern how the group will reach an 
                                                                                                     
 59. White House Privacy Framework, supra note 4, at 2. 
 60. Id. at 1-2, 35-36. 
 61. See Sengupta, supra note 16. 
 62. White House Privacy Framework, supra note 4, at 2, 29-30. 
 63. Id. at 2-3, 31-33. 
 64. Id. at 2.  
 65. Id. at 23.  
 66. Id. at 25. 
 67. Id. at 23-24. 
 68. Id. at 26. 
 69. Id. at 27. 
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orderly conclusion, even if there is not complete agreement on results.”70  The 
discussions were intended to produce codes of conduct for various industry groups 
or sectors.71 
The administration foresaw a co-regulatory model,72 featuring 
multistakeholder created codes of conduct backed by FTC enforcement.73  Under 
Section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC is empowered to enforce a code of conduct 
pursuant to a company’s voluntary decision to enroll.74  The administration 
suggested that companies’ incentive to engage in the process would be twofold: 
building consumer trust and benefitting from a safe harbor to FTC enforcement.75  
Moreover, the administration envisaged that the FTC would have explicit 
statutory authority to review codes of conduct against prospective privacy 
legislation.76  Importantly, “the Administration recommends . . . giving the FTC the 
authority to grant a ‘safe harbor’—that is, forbearance from enforcement of the 
statutory Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights—to companies that follow a code of 
conduct that the FTC has reviewed and approved.”77  In the absence of such 
legislation, however, these new FTC powers are weakened, given that there is no 
law to assess the code of conduct against, and no law from which to grant 
immunity.  Hence, if the administration fails to deliver on the statutory promise in 
its strategy, the FTC would have to revert to its current stance: enforcement only 
against companies that voluntarily and publicly commit to following a code of 
conduct and then fail to deliver.  
C. European Union Support  
Not only the U.S., but also the EU, promotes self- and co-regulation.  Under 
Article 27 of the European Data Protection Directive:  
(1) The Member States and the Commission shall encourage the drawing up of 
codes of conduct intended to contribute to the proper implementation of the 
national provisions adopted by the Member States pursuant to this Directive, 
taking account of the specific features of the various sectors. 
 
(2) Member States shall make provision for trade associations and other bodies 
representing other categories of controllers which have drawn up draft national 
codes or which have the intention of amending or extending existing national 
                                                                                                     
 70. Id. at 27. 
 71. Id. at 26. 
 72. Dennis Hirsch defines co-regulation as a process in which government and private parties share 
responsibility for development and enforcement of regulatory rules; they may do so by splitting the 
tasks up: “For example, government might set the overall goals but then allow industry to set and 
enforce the standards.  Or, more commonly, government and the private sector might perform one or 
more of the tasks together.”  Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-
Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 465 (2011). 
 73. White House Privacy Framework, supra note 4, at 26-27. 
 74. Id. at 27, 29. 
 75. Id. at 24.  
 76. Id. at 37.  
 77. Id. 
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codes to be able to submit them to the opinion of the national authority.78 
National data protection authorities and the Article 29 Working Party are 
authorized to review and confirm the compliance of a multistakeholder code of 
conduct with European or national data protection law.79  Interestingly, this 
framework has come short of generating co-regulatory zeal.  To date, nearly twenty 
years after the introduction of the European Data Protection Directive, only one 
code of conduct has been submitted for regulatory approval—by the Federation of 
European Direct and Interactive Marketing.80  
On January 25, 2012, the European Commission proposed a new General Data 
Protection Regulation that would replace the European Data Protection Directive.81  
Like the European Data Protection Directive, the proposed General Data Protection 
Regulation would endorse the development of sector-based codes of conduct, 
which could then be submitted for regulatory approval.82  Under Article 38 of the 
proposed General Data Protection Regulation, such codes of conduct would be 
eligible for approval by the European Commission.83  Furthermore, Article 39 of 
the proposed General Data Protection Regulation would authorize new co-
regulatory mechanisms, namely “the establishment of data protection certification 
mechanisms and of data protection seals and marks.”84  Such programs, developed 
by the private sector and ratified by the European Commission, would allow 
individuals to quickly assess the level of data protection provided by companies.85 
IV. ASSESSING MULTISTAKEHOLDER PROCESSES IN PRACTICE: DO NOT TRACK 
Despite best intentions, recent efforts at multistakeholder policymaking leave 
much to be desired.  This Article focuses on a test case, the W3C discussion of a 
DNT standard, which at this point, more than two years after its launch, appears to 
                                                                                                     
 78. Council Directive 95/46, art. 27(1)-(2), 1995 O.J. (L281) 31 (EC). 
 79. Id. at art. 28(3)-(4). 
 80. The only code submitted for approval was the Federation of European Direct and Interactive 
Marketing’s (FEDMA) Community Code, which provides a legal safe harbor in all European Member 
States to adherent direct marketing firms, and was approved by the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party in 2003.  WORKING PARTY 77, OPINION 3/2003 OF THE ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING 
PARTY ON THE EUROPEAN CODE OF CONDUCT OF FEDMA FOR THE USE OF PERSONAL DATA IN DIRECT 
MARKETING (June 13, 2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/ 
2003/wp77_en.pdf (approving FEDMA code); see also WORKING PARTY 174, OPINION 4/2010 OF THE 
ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY ON THE EUROPEAN CODE OF CONDUCT OF FEDMA 
FOR THE USE OF PERSONAL DATA IN DIRECT MARKETING (July 13, 2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/ 
2010/wp174_en.pdf (approving annex to the FEDMA code covering online marketing). 
 81. EUR. COMM’N, PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL ON THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA 
AND ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF SUCH DATA (GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION) COM 
(2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/ 
review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf.  
 82. Id. at ch. IV, § 5. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  See ROWENA RODRIGUES ET AL., EUR. COMM’N JOINT RES. CTR. INST. FOR THE PROT. & 
SEC. OF THE CITIZEN, EU PRIVACY SEALS PROJECT, INVENTORY AND ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY 
CERTIFICATION SCHEMES, FINAL REPORT STUDY DELIVERABLE 1.4, at 12 (Dec. 2013). 
 85. Rodrigues et al., supra note 51, at 12. 
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be going nowhere and is constantly on the verge of implosion.86  Other processes, 
such as the NTIA’s facilitation of a multistakeholder process to develop a code of 
conduct on Mobile App Transparency, fared somewhat better, but even there the 
process was protracted and yielded a modest result.87  The resulting code has drawn 
mixed reviews from the public.88  Importantly, it is not yet clear which company (if 
any) will adopt it, what the consequences of noncompliance are, and to what extent 
it will change the reality on the ground.89  
DNT started as an advocacy group initiative, submitted during an FTC 
workshop on behavioral advertising in October 2007.90  The group, led by the 
Center for Democracy and Technology, proposed: “To help ensure that [the 
privacy] principles are followed, the FTC should [c]reate a national Do Not Track 
List similar to the national Do Not Call List.”91  The proposal would have required 
advertisers to submit their tracking domains to the FTC, which would make a DNT 
list available on its website for download by users who wish to limit tracking.92  
The idea remained dormant until July 2009, when privacy advocate 
Christopher Soghoian first developed his Targeted Advertising Cookie Opt-Out 
(TACO) mechanism as a prototype plug-in that automatically checks for a header 
                                                                                                     
 86. Omer Tene, DNT 2.0: What Next for Policymakers?, IAPP: PRIVACY PERSPECTIVES (Sept. 18, 
2013), www.privacyassociation.org/privacy_perspectives/post/dnt_2.0_what_next_for_policymakers.  
 87. Short Form Notice Code of Conduct to Promote Transparency in Mobile App Practices, NAT’L 
TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (July 25, 2013), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ 
july_25_code_draft.pdf.  
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HEAD IN THE DIGITAL SAND: HOW THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S NTIA-LED MULTISTAKEHOLDER 
EFFORT DOESN’T DELIVER ITS PROMISED PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS (Aug. 2013), available at 
http://www.centerfordigitaldemocracy.org/sites/default/files/CDDPrivacyObamaAdmReportAugust201
3.pdf.  Chester was quoted saying: “The NTIA [] should be nominated to run elections for the 
Kremlin[.] . . . They went from ‘There's no consensus’ to ‘There is consensus that the document is final 
for now but can be changed in part based on testing.’” Katy Bachman, Privacy Vote Sends Mixed 
Signals: No Consensus on Voluntary Code of Conduct for Apps, ADWEEK (July 25, 2013, 6:51 PM), 
http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/privacy-vote-sends-mixed-signals-151450. See also 
Angelique Carson, Did NTIA's Multi-Stakeholder Process Work? Depends on Whom You Ask, IAPP: 
THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (Sept. 3, 2013), www.privacyassociation.org/publications/did_ntias_multi_ 
stakeholder_process_work_depends_whom_you_ask.  
 89. Some would say that the NTIA is much less equipped to handle a multistakeholder process that 
organizations such as the IETF, W3C and ICANN, which have been around much longer and have 
policies, procedures, an infrastructure and a culture and a history of multistakeholder negotiations.  
 90. Ari Schwartz et al., Consumer Rights and Protections in the Behavioral Advertising Sector, 
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Oct. 31, 2007), www.cdt.org/privacy/ 
20071031consumerprotectionsbehavioral.pdf; What Does “Do Not Track” Mean? A Scoping Proposal 
by the Center for Democracy & Technology, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. 1 (Jan. 31, 2011), 
www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-DNT-Report.pdf.  
 91. Schwartz et al., supra note 90 at 4. 
 92. Id. 
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on a website to determine whether to allow tracking cookies,93 but the concept 
failed to resonate with the broader policy or advertising communities.94  DNT first 
gained momentum as a viable policy concept on July 27, 2010, when FTC 
Chairman Jon Leibowitz testified at the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation on efforts to protect consumer privacy.95  Departing from 
scripted remarks, Chairman Leibowitz stated that the FTC was calling for an 
industry-led DNT program.96  
Initial industry response was hardly enthusiastic, declaring that “[i]f mandated 
by the government, this would be tantamount to a government-sponsored, and 
possibly managed, ad-blocking program—something inimical to the First 
Amendment.”97  DNT was seen as distraction from self-regulatory efforts 
organized by advertising industry groups, which were based on icons placed on 
behavioral ads and leading to opt-out tools.98  However, the release of the FTC’s 
Preliminary Report in December 2010, which stated that “Commission staff 
supports a more uniform and comprehensive consumer choice mechanism for 
online behavioral advertising, sometimes referred to as ‘Do Not Track’” prompted 
the major browser makers to seriously engage with the DNT proposal.99 
                                                                                                     
 93. Christopher Soghoian, TACO 2.0 Released, SLIGHT PARANOIA (July 27, 2009, 7:00 AM), 
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 96. Compare id., with Consumer Online Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Commerce, Sci., 
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 97. IAB Reviews Preliminary FTC Staff Report on Protecting Consumer Privacy, INTERACTIVE 
ADVER. BUREAU (Dec. 1, 2010), www.iab.net/public_policy/1481209.  
 98. Colin O’Malley, Self-Regulation Solves the Do Not Track Problem, INTERACTIVE ADVER. 
BUREAU (Feb. 23, 2011, 4:57 PM), www.iab.net/iablog/2011/02/self-regulation-solves-the-do-.html.  
 99. The content of this supporting footnote is adapted from Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 5, at 
324-26: In December 2010, Microsoft implemented a “Tracking Protection” feature in its new Internet 
Explorer 9 browser, allowing users to select a Tracking Protection List (TPL) from a choice provided by 
various organizations, such as Abine, EasyList, PrivacyChoice, and TRUSTe. IE9 and Privacy: 
Introducing Tracking Protection, WINDOWS INTERNET EXPLORER ENGINEERING TEAM BLOG (Dec. 7, 
2010, 1:10 PM), http://blogs.msdn.com/b/ie/archive/2010/12/07/ie9-and-privacy-introducing-tracking-
protection-v8.aspx.  While presented as an opt-in mechanism, TPL was really an opt-out tool (which 
users could choose to opt-into).  Nick Wingfield & Julia Angwin, Microsoft Adds Privacy Tool, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 15, 2011, at B1. Despite earlier skepticism about the concept, Microsoft also added a DNT 
browser header—which was automatically activated when a TPL (even an empty one) was uploaded—
in its final release of Internet Explorer 9. Id. Mozilla, maker of the Firefox browser, presented an 
approach based on a DNT browser header. Aaron Brauer-Rieke, “Do Not Track” Gains Momentum as 
Mozilla Announces New Tracking Tool, CTR. DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Jan. 24, 2011), 
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/aaron-brauer-rieke/%E2%80%9Cdo-not-track%E2%80%9D-gains-
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In early 2011, W3C received a member submission from Microsoft proposing 
standardization of a DNT signal and tracking protection lists.100  An April 2011 
workshop on Web Tracking and User Privacy at Princeton University brought 
together almost a hundred participants from diverse backgrounds, out of which was 
chartered the Working Group.101  The Working Group was formed to “produce 
[r]ecommendation-track specifications for a simple machine-readable preference 
expression mechanism (‘Do Not Track’) and technologies for selectively allowing 
or blocking tracking elements,” and to “define the scope of the user preference and 
practices for compliance with it in a way that will inform and be informed by the 
technical specification.”102  Its success criteria were set forth as: “Production of 
stable Recommendation-track specifications”; and “Adoption of deliverables by 
user agents and compliance by industry.”103  
The initial Working Group meeting in Princeton already featured some of the 
persistent weaknesses that would continue to haunt W3C discussions, such as the 
inability to define the nature of the “tracking” that DNT protects users from, as 
well as peculiar decision-making processes.104  For example, participants in the 
workshop voted on the appropriate definition of “tracking” through two “hum” 
                                                                                                     
momentum-mozilla-announces-new-tracking-tool. In January 2011, Mozilla released Firefox 4, which 
allowed users to check a “Do Not Track” box in the “advanced” settings of the browser, prompting a 
header to be sent with every click or page request signaling to websites that the user does not wish to be 
tracked. Mozilla Firefox 4 Beta, Now Including “Do Not Track” Capabilities, MOZILLA BLOG (Feb. 8, 
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http://googlepublicpolicy.blog spot.com/2011/01/keep-your-opt-outs.html. The new plug-in was meant 
to remedy the recurrent problem whereby users cleared out any opt-out cookies when purging their 
cookie folder, thus unknowingly re-entering the tracking domain.  Harvey & Moonka, supra.  Keep My 
Opt-Outs is itself cookie based—it deletes all cookies sent by registered domains and adds a DNT 
cookie for such domains.  Id.  Apple too added a DNT tool to a test version of its Safari browser 
included within the latest version of Lion, its new operating system. Nick Wingfield, Apple Adds Do-
Not-Track Tool to New Browser, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2011, at B5.   
 100. Andy Zeigler, Adrian Bateman, & Eliot Graff, Web Tracking Protection: W3C Member 
Submission 24 February 2011, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (Feb. 24, 2011), 
http://www.w3.org/Submission/2011/SUBM-web-tracking-protection-20110224. 
 101. W3C Workshop on Web Tracking and User Privacy, Workshop Report, WORLD WIDE WEB 
CONSORTIUM (Sept. 11, 2011), www.w3.org/2011/track-privacy/report.html [hereinafter Workshop 
Report]. 
 102. Tracking Protection Working Group Charter, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (Sept. 25, 
2013), www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/charter.html.  
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Workshop Report, supra note 101 (“Initially, regarding definitions of tracking, two ‘hum’ polls 
were taken.  Among three choices for tracking—all tracking; tracking for online behavioral advertising; 
or some middle ground broad definition with certain exceptions (as in CDT's or EFF's proposals)—
participants were fairly evenly divided on which proposal they would prefer to start with.  Among the 
same set of choices, participants were also asked which would be a non-starter: while there were 
objections to the broad definition and the OBA-only definition, no one responded that the CDT-style 
proposal was an unacceptable starting point.”). 
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polls.105  Addressing this method, one participant complained, “There are billions 
of dollars at stake and the future of the Internet, and we’re trying to decide if one 
third-party is covered or didn’t hum louder!”106  
The march of the Working Group is described in detail in a July 16, 2013, 
memorandum by Peter Swire, the Working Group’s co-chair at the time.107  This 
Article is not intended to exhaustively document the Working Group’s 
deliberations, but rather to assess its (lack of) outcome as a test case for 
multistakeholder policymaking, in light of the claimed advantages of 
multistakeholder-driven self-regulation and co-regulation.  
A. Expeditious Decision-Making 
Pursuant to the preliminary workshop at Princeton in April 2011, the Working 
Group first met in September 2011 on the MIT campus in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.108  The First Public Working Drafts for both parts were published in 
November 2011.109  Since then,110 the Working Group has conducted 105 
teleconferences (typically lasting ninety minutes each) and met seven more times 
for multi-day face-to-face meetings, twice in Europe and the rest in the U.S., plus 
an additional meeting of the Global Considerations Task Force in Berlin.111  In 
addition, it hosted a high-traffic mailing list and a web-based issue tracker.112  The 
Working Group has seen the departure of two chairs as well as key staffers.113  It 
currently lists ninety-nine participants from forty-two organizations as well as 
seven “Invited Experts.”114  If participants agree on one thing, it is that the process 
was long, drawn out, and time consuming.115  
The Working Group was originally chartered through July 2012.116  The 
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 106. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Participant (Dec. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Anonymous 
Participant Interview (Dec. 19, 2013)]. 
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 116. See Tracking Protection Working Group Charter, supra note 102. 
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charter has been extended twice, currently running until April 2014.117  After more 
than two years of deliberations and failure to achieve its stated goals, it is safe to 
say that the Working Group did not obtain a result expeditiously.  To be sure, the 
Working Group has been successful in fostering multistakeholder discussion (and 
garnering media attention).118  As Jonathan Mayer, a Stanford graduate student in 
computer science and law who participated in the process as an “invited expert” 
said, “Where it has been successful is uncovering all of the possible issues 
surrounding the particular topic. It’s been very good at discussion, pulling out 
points of view, looking at how large the gap or divide may be.”119  
This is not stated cynically. An exchange of ideas, data, and proposals between 
various stakeholders in the Internet economy is a laudable goal, albeit not the 
Working Group’s purpose. Mayer stated,  
this notion—that groups that have had radically different views on major policy 
issues for a long time are going to sit down and negotiate for half a year or a year 
and come to some agreement that reconciles those views—it sounds like a pretty 
big stretch.  Not impossible—you could imagine ways in which they were talking 
past each other, there were some misunderstandings, or some way of 
accommodating both visions—but unlikely.120  
In what follows, this Part identifies several factors that hampered the Working 
Group’s quest for a swift resolution: 
1. Decision-Making Rules 
First and foremost, the Working Group’s rules for decision-making were not 
clear, leading to protracted and often circular discussions without an exit strategy.  
The W3C website states, “W3C Working Groups make decisions via consensus.  In 
this context, consensus does not require unanimity, but majority votes are a last 
resort.  The chairs are responsible for determining and recording consensus.”121  
Yet, what does consensus mean in the context of the Working Group’s DNT 
discussions?122  Surely it cannot mean unanimity, which would embolden each and 
every participant to hold up an accord.  But what, short of unanimity but stricter 
than simple majority, constitutes consensus?  
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Several participants complained that not only were the rules of engagement 
unclear from the start, but they were also changed frequently throughout the 
process. Mayer said that  
the rules pretty much changed depending on the time and depending on whom you 
asked.  To hear the chairs tell it early on, there needed to be agreement across at 
least three broad stakeholder views: the companies that were tracking users 
(advertising, analytics, social and so on), the web browsers, and the participants 
who roughly represented user concerns.  If you want to slice and dice a little more 
finely, you might say something like, we will break out advertising, analytics, and 
social; we might break out big versus small companies; then web browsers; then 
maybe we break out activists versus researchers versus policymakers.  But some 
rough notion of buckets, and you had to get agreement from all of these.123  
Clearly, participants did not know which stakeholders needed to sign off on a 
deal before consensus was announced.  And whereas “hum” polls were accepted 
for determining consensus early on in the process, some decisions were later made 
via online voting, where supporters of a proposition vote “+1” and opponents “-
1.”124  This implies a simple majority rule, quite distant from the consensus-based 
model anticipated by some of the participants.   
2. Representation and Composition 
The requisite voting majority touches on the related issue of representation.  
Formal policymaking processes are typically run according to clear rules of 
representation.125  The fact that there are as many representatives from Delaware in 
the Senate as there are from Texas could conceivably be controversial, but it is 
grounded in rules written into the Constitution.126  In top-down regulation, elected 
officials or regulators whom they appoint are the ones driving policymaking, 
providing a degree of public representation and accountability.127  Yet, when it 
comes to self- or co-regulatory multistakeholder processes, equitable representation 
norms are fickle. 
Whom are Working Group participants representing?  For example, did 
Mayer, the Stanford PhD student and privacy advocate who joined the Working 
Group as an “invited expert,” represent 2.5 billion Internet users or just himself?  
Or perhaps something in between, such as all Internet users who live in Palo Alto 
and own a Mac?  Similarly, among the many industry participants, should votes be 
weighed by consumer base, market share or some other criteria, or should Google’s 
vote be equal to that of a small online ad intermediary?  Clearly, if the votes are not 
weighed, but rather tallied by show of hands, the composition of the Working 
Group becomes determinative.  Indeed, “packing” the Working Group with as 
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many allies as possible can ensure a desirable result.  
Packing the Working Group was possible, though costly, given that 
participation fees amounted to more than $68,000 for large companies,128 $7,900 
for small and medium size companies and large NGOs,129 and $2,250 for small 
enterprises with less than 10 employees.130  Some advocates argued that the 
strategy for industry was to pay for as many participants as possible, sometimes 
resulting in industry groups overlapping with their constituents.131  For example, 
the DAA attended the Working Group together with its constituent industry groups, 
the American Association of Advertising Agencies (4A’s), Direct Marketing 
Association, Interactive Advertising Bureau, and NAI, as well as multiple 
corporate members of these groups.132  In this context it was not always clear 
whether, on any given issue, an industry group represented all of its members, a 
majority thereof, or perhaps only itself.  
Mayer argued that the imperative for industry was not to pack the Working 
Group so as to assure passage of resolutions, but rather to prevent any resolution 
that may be damaging. In his words,  
One strategic call that advertising groups made—that I think was a very good call 
for their part—was to try to pack the group, to try to get as many people in.  Not 
necessarily because they thought they could get anything done that way, but 
because they thought it would make it really, really hard for the group to ever 
come to any sort of agreement that they disagreed with.133 
While advocates argued that the Working Group was dominated by industry, 
some industry participants claimed that the protracted discussions, necessary travel, 
and substantial participation fee meant that the group was captured not by the 
industry as a whole, but rather by a small subset consisting of large, multinational 
corporations.134  Small- and medium-sized enterprises, which make up a large 
portion of the Internet economy, particularly in areas still vibrant with 
entrepreneurship and growth, were thus underrepresented and greatly 
disadvantaged.  Not only would they have to invest the high participation fee, but 
they would also need to expend human resources to attend the meetings and follow 
the discussion.  
The only Working Group participants exempt from participation fees were 
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those admitted by the chairs as “invited experts.”135  Currently, this group, whose 
selection criteria remain opaque,136 comprises seven such “invited experts,” 
including three privacy advocates (Jeffrey Chester, John Simpson, and Walter van 
Holst), two academics (Edward Felten and Paul Ohm), a European academic-
regulator (Rob van Eijk), and a libertarian think tanker (Berin Szoka).  In terms of 
opportunity costs, even without participation fees, the burden on civil society 
representatives was heavy.  Privacy advocates had to spend their time and effort 
gratis in dozens of meetings and web forums, while industry lawyers and lobbyists 
were paid to represent their companies in the same discussions.137  Mayer added, 
“The opportunity costs look very, very different and the ability to marshal 
resources also.”138 
3. Delay Tactics 
One advocate, Alexander Hanff, argued that regardless of procedural rules, the 
deck was stacked against civil society given that a good result for industry would 
be for the Working Group to achieve no result at all.139  He claimed that during the 
protracted discussions, industry could continue to run rampant using any available 
and newly developed tracking technologies and capabilities.140  To stop the 
snowball effect, civil society needed a clean “victory,” while industry’s best 
strategy was to stall, pushing back deadline after deadline, while continuing to 
track users.141  In his view, a potential win for civil society could only occur 
through the judicial system or the court of public opinion,142 not via a 
multistakeholder process.143  
Mayer said,  
[There were] myriad ways of delaying within the W3C process.  It’s trivial to re-
raise an issue that’s been discussed for years.  It’s almost laughable.  The stuff 
that people were talking about even before the W3C process is the very same stuff 
we’re talking about today.  It’s kind of like circling the drain but never actually 
going down it.  And so it’s really easy to continue to have those endless 
discussions.144 
This approach, however, depicts industry as a monolith whose interest is to 
avert regulation.  In reality, industry comprises a plethora of voices, including 
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factions that compete vigorously against one another.145  Indeed, some industry 
participants said that their biggest concern throughout the process was not the 
engagement with consumer advocates, but rather the power play between 
companies trying to cement a competitive advantage via a global technology 
standard while W3C remains on the sidelines.  
4. The Role of the Chair 
In any policymaking process, the role of the chair is key both in terms of 
agenda setting and decision-making.146  Clearly, if the chair could break deadlock 
and force a decision over the objection of some of the participants, he or she would 
have the power to drive the process forward.  Yet, in the case of the Working 
Group, the chair lacked formal decision-making authority and acted more as a 
facilitator.147  Importantly, the chair’s responsibilities did not include drafting the 
deliverables, a task assigned to designated “editors.”148  In addition, from the 
outset, the Working Group operated with two (currently three) co-chairs—in and of 
itself a mode that weakens the chair’s role.149  
Initially, the Working Group appointed two chairs: Matthias Schunter (first 
with IBM and now Intel) led the development of the Tracking Preference 
Expression Specification, which defines the technical mechanisms for expressing a 
DNT preference; and Aleecia McDonald (first Mozilla and now Stanford) led the 
development of the Tracking Compliance and Scope Specification, which defines 
the meaning of a DNT preference and sets out practices for websites to comply 
with this preference.150  In November 2012, Peter Swire (first Ohio State and now 
Georgia Tech) succeeded McDonald as the co-chair for the compliance 
specification.151  Swire, in turn, departed in August 2013 to join the President’s 
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies.152  When asked 
about the chair’s selection process, one participant said,  
They just come up with the name, there is no process.  They give you no 
transparency into who was considered, why various candidates were not 
considered, or why they ultimately were not asked—or even those that were asked 
and then politely rejected the offer.  There was no transparency into any of that 
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process; it was just a name delivered at the end of the day.153 
Several Working Group participants noted that during McDonald’s term, the 
role of the chair was viewed as an enabler of discussion, in charge of helping 
bridge differences between the different factions.  In the words of a participant, 
“the chair was otherwise a first among equals, just another voice in the group.”154  
Swire, on the other hand, sought to be more proactive, but his quest too fell flat 
amid a storm of allegations, with multiple participants questioning the source of his 
authority to substitute his own judgment for that of the Working Group.155  
Referring to the chairs’ efforts, Mayer said, “There were many, many people from 
advertising companies and advocacy groups who were just unhappy across the 
board because of this notion that ‘hey, the chairs are wonderful, but what special 
legitimacy do they have to decide how the rules of the road should go on web 
browsers?’”156 
5. Drafting a Straw Man 
A related issue concerns the identity and role of the party “holding the pen.” 
To prevent endless discussion, particularly of issues with complex social, economic 
and even philosophical dimensions, such as those implicated in DNT, someone 
must ground the debate in a straw man document, which can be thoroughly edited 
and even replaced during the process.157  As Mayer said, “The factual exploration 
is great, and it’s a necessary predicate to the work getting done, but we want to 
make sure people remember that it’s a predicate; it’s not the goal.”158  In 
multistakeholder processes organized by the FTC and California Attorney 
General,159 it was evident that regardless of stakeholder input, the regulator held the 
pen. Despite the NTIA not itself holding enforcement powers, even that process 
was channeled to a document written by the organizer itself.160  Conversely, the 
Working Group discussions ran rampant without a backstop, as even the chairs 
were unauthorized to crystalize the discussion into a compromise text.161 
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6. Web-Based Communications Tools 
Another potentially complicating factor for the discussion was the Working 
Group’s use of an official backchannel, an active email listserv for debating the 
open issues.162  Mayer explained that the online discussions “had a tendency to get 
a little vitriolic at times, where it wasn’t even meant that way it was just that—as 
anyone who sends email knows—it’s super easy to misunderstand the tone 
someone uses.”163  Some participants stated they felt obliged to be constantly 
engaged on the backchannel to immediately refute any position they disagreed with 
lest others assume they concurred.164  
John Verdi of the NTIA, which had no official backchannel, noted “we wanted 
to keep the process as open as possible, so what happened in the room was the 
official record; this kept everyone on the same page, and we didn’t have people 
saying ‘oh, I raised this on the list’ or ‘I opened this issue on the backchannel.’”165  
He added that, “remote participation is challenging to get right, but important to 
provide.  No geographic location has a monopoly on expertise, so we need to do 
the best we can to enable participation from stakeholders outside DC.”166 
Mayer noted that towards the last stages of the process, there was a sense that a 
deal may be being negotiated behind the scenes where not everyone had a voice.  
He stated: 
That rankled a bunch of folks in the group. And this came out through the 
framework and drafts and so on that were getting pitched—these documents 
seemingly came out of nowhere.  But clearly they came out of some backroom 
talks between certain groups of stakeholders. That was really uncomfortable.167  
The Working Group used another web-based communication resource—an 
issue tracker intended to capture and contain the open and closed topics for 
discussion.168  Alas, use of this tool became daunting, given that the Working 
Group was unable to close an issue without at the same time opening several more, 
whether duplicative, linked, or entirely independent.169  Instead of streamlining the 
discussion and stimulating progress, the issue tracker contributed to a chaotic 
environment and facilitated what some participants characterized as filibuster 
tactics.170  Conceivably, if the chairs controlled the list of open issues, the issue 
tracker could have been conducive to progress.  Yet, as discussed above, the 
Working Group chairs were not perceived as empowered to even decide whether an 
issue remains outstanding or not.171  
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B. Informed by Industry Knowledge and Expertise 
One of the main perceived virtues of multistakeholder policymaking is the 
ability to draw on the knowledge and expertise of multiple parties from various 
parts of the ecosystem.  This is only true, however, if the parties can agree on the 
facts. In the DNT context, this was not typically the case.  Quite the contrary, 
Working Group participants consistently sparred over basic concepts, terms, and 
definitions, such as the level of data collection required to ensure basic online 
functionality.172  Indeed, after more than two years of deliberations, the Working 
Group has not yet been able to define many of the fundamental terms underlying a 
tracking protection policy, not least the meaning of “tracking” itself.173  As Swire 
noted in the Chair’s Explanatory Memorandum, “Defining the term ‘tracking’ is 
obviously an important aspect of defining the meaning of ‘Do Not Track.’”174 
1. Arguing over Facts 
Consider, for example, data de-identification.175  A deep rift separated the 
position of several “invited experts,” such as Edward Felten (Princeton) and 
Jonathan Mayer (Stanford), from those of industry voices such as Shane Wiley 
(Yahoo).176  While Wiley argued that hashing unique identifiers would be sufficient 
to separate data from real world identities, Felten and Mayer believed that as long 
as such pseudonymized data could be re-identified, it must be viewed as 
personal.177  As Mayer said, “we’d have these radically different views—radically 
different technical views, not just talking policy implications. There was just no 
way of reconciling them. The W3C had no way of saying ‘okay, pony up with your 
technical experts.’”178  Hence, the disagreements were not over policy or legal 
interpretation, but rather around the facts. In the words of Albert Einstein, “If the 
facts don't fit the theory, change the facts.”179   
2. Engineers vs. Lawyers 
Some participants lamented the steady shift of the Working Group makeup 
from a tight-knit engineering clique to a group dominated by lawyers and 
government relations professionals.180  This is not surprising, given that the issues 
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on the agenda cut to the core of high stakes business and social policy 
considerations.  In medieval days, a discussion among scientists would cease to be 
purely scientific when the existence of god became an issue.  At that point, the 
bishops would rush into the room.  Similarly, when Working Group discussions 
became fraught with business and policy implications, the nature of the 
discussants’ expertise shifted as well.181 
One complication participants noted about dealing with lawyers and 
government affairs professionals is that they may not have sufficient technical 
expertise.  Joanne McNabb, Director of Privacy Education and Policy at the 
California Attorney General’s Office, who participated in the process run by her 
office, said: 
[Lawyers and government affairs professionals] don’t have the actual knowledge 
that you need, so they have to keep going back, back, back.  We made an effort to 
get people who are not only with this particular stakeholder but also have the 
operational or more direct knowledge of what the issue is.  And, at the very least, 
to encourage the government affairs representatives, if they’re the ones who end 
up coming, to go back and get to the people who are actually going to have the 
substantive knowledge and get them engaged.182 
In addition, some participants thought that as a matter of professional ethos, 
engineers viewed the issues as problems to solve, while government affairs and 
legal experts were less likely to come to agreement.183 
C. Fostering Collaboration and Compliance 
Proponents of a multistakeholder process claim that rules negotiated by the 
industry are more likely to foster implementation and compliance.  Instead, the 
Working Group discussions increasingly became more polarized and accompanied 
by a constant drumbeat of warnings that industry players would vote with their feet 
and ignore any result that came short of their expectations.  
1. Good Spec; No Implementation 
This dire prediction resonates in light of the historical example of another 
W3C foray into policymaking, the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) standard 
issued in 2002.184  P3P was conceived as a standard allowing users and websites to 
match privacy policies through machine-readable code.185  Specifically, P3P would 
enable machine-readable privacy policies that could be retrieved automatically by 
web browsers or other user agents.186  The browser would then compare each 
                                                                                                     
 181. Id.  
 182. Telephone Interview with Joanne McNabb, Dir. Privacy Educ. & Policy, Cal. Att’y Gen. Office 
(Dec. 15, 2013) [hereinafter McNabb Interview]. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Lorie Cranor et al., The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0) Specification, W3C 
Recommendation, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (Apr. 16, 2002), http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P.   
 185. See id.; Ari Schwartz, Looking Back at P3P: Lessons for the Future, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & 
TECH. (Nov. 2009), http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/P3P_Retro_Final_0.pdf. 
 186. Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project, Enabling Smarter Privacy Tools for the Web, 
WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (Nov. 20, 2007), http://www.w3.org/P3P.  
462 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:2 
policy against a user’s privacy preferences and assist the user in deciding when to 
exchange data with a website or deploy additional features, such as user alerts or 
cookie blockers.187  
To discuss implementation, the W3C set up a working group, which embarked 
on a long and laborious process spanning almost a decade.188  Lorrie Cranor, who 
led the discussions, compared the process to “an out-of-control construction on a 
kitchen that at first only needs a small new appliance (a toaster) but ends up with a 
plan for new cabinets, floors and lighting.”189  On the one hand, privacy advocates 
opposed P3P on the grounds that industry groups were using it “as an excuse to 
delay the progress of genuine enforceable privacy rights in the US”;190 the 
European Article 29 Working Party voiced similar concerns.191  On the other hand, 
industry viewed the emerging standard with suspicion, concerned about excessive 
transparency and the potential impact on business practices.192 
After initial roll out, P3P appeared to have a “chicken and egg” problem: P3P 
policies would not be created until there was implementation by a widely used web 
browser, but browser implementation would not do anything until there were 
policies online.193 Microsoft’s Internet Explorer was the only major browser to 
adopt P3P, and it continues to do so to this day.194  However, most Internet 
Explorer users remain completely unaware of P3P.195  Worse, thousands of 
websites, including some of the web’s most popular sites, “post bogus P3P 
‘compact policies’ that circumvent the default P3P-based cookie-blocking system 
in Internet Explorer.”196  
In many ways, the Working Group effort to standardize DNT is reminiscent of 
the P3P fiasco.  As Mayer said, “At the end of the day, if you come out with 
something that only one company wants to implement—and this is an understood, 
voluntary process—then hopefully the collective should understand that it was a 
failure.”197 
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2. Incentive to Comply? 
What is the incentive on the part of industry to adopt a standard produced 
through a multistakeholder process?  If multistakeholder input is sought as part of a 
formal process of top-down regulation, such as in notice and comment rulemaking, 
industry will engage in order to influence the resulting framework.  If negotiations 
take place against a backdrop of binding legislation, industry could be in it to 
benefit from an enforcement safe harbor or clearer statutory guidance.  
The NTIA process is a hybrid between a “quasi voluntary” discussion with a 
regulator, such as the FTC or California Attorney General, and a purely voluntary 
process, such as the Working Group.  On the one hand, the NTIA does not have 
enforcement powers and cannot impose a compromise.  On the other hand, a 
process orchestrated by the U.S. government is likely to command close attention 
from the industry.  The fear, which some think materialized,198 is that an accord 
reached in these circumstances—obligatory participation but little enforcement 
prospect—will be vague or narrow in scope and not command a large following.   
The dynamic is very different in the context of the Working Group, which 
operates in the absence of existing regulation.  Here, stalling tactics come at no 
cost, and the process could ostensibly continue forever.  
3. External Disruptions 
Despite all of the shortcomings discussed above, the Working Group would 
have been in relatively good shape had it not been for several exogenous 
disruptions.  All of the participants interviewed, including both privacy advocates 
and industry representatives, pointed to Microsoft’s August 2012 decision to switch 
DNT on by default in Internet Explorer199 as a cataclysmic event for the Working 
Group.200  After that, the process spiraled out of control and focused on struggling 
to keep the stakeholders at the table.  An additional blow came in February 2013, 
when Mozilla announced it would set Firefox browsers to automatically block 
third-party cookies.201 
The move by Microsoft, whose various versions of Internet Explorer continue 
to command more than 50% of the desktop market,202 was particularly significant, 
because the industry recoiled from any contemplated compromise. Industry 
representatives were prepared to negotiate the specifics of an opt-out tool, realizing 
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that the majority of users would not tamper with the default.203  The implications of 
a major browser automatically opting-out users were grim for any business 
operating in the online advertising space.  Industry, thus, retrenched and acted as if 
it was fighting for survival.204  Referring to Microsoft’s move, one participant 
remarked, “The trust was gone.  There was no trust left.  They’d been in the process 
for a year agreeing on default off, and then unilaterally made this massive public 
statement to gain their own competitive advantage against Google and others.”205  
Mayer suggested, however, that major external events could conceivably serve 
as a catalyst for concessions:  
When it looked like Microsoft’s decision to enable DNT by default in a beta 
version of Internet Explorer was going to potentially jeopardize negotiations, 
advocates suddenly made some concessions.  And when it looked like companies 
were going to start cracking down on technical countermeasures—browser 
companies, too—there were some hints of concessions out of the ad industry.  So, 
W3C provides the forum, but it was things outside of W3C that moved the needle 
on how close to an agreement we were.206  
Microsoft’s announcement was not the only external event to rock the boat. 
Other notable disruptions were caused by change of personnel, including two of the 
chairs, as well as the decision of the DAA to leave the process.207  And while such 
developments are not unexpected in the context of a process that lingers for years, 
they clearly did not improve the odds for the Working Group to reach an accord. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Profound technological changes and shifting social norms have forced privacy 
policymakers to chase a rapidly moving target.  This has led government and 
regulatory agencies to coopt industry and civil society representatives in search of 
self- or co-regulatory models based on multistakeholder discourse.  The purported 
advantages of multistakeholder policymaking abound and include fact- and 
experience-based deliberations, expeditious results, and enhanced implementation 
and compliance.  This Article assesses why one such process, the W3C quest to 
standardize DNT, failed to deliver along these vectors.  Instead, W3C’s efforts 
featured protracted discussions not leading to tangible results, erratic decision-
making processes, persistent disagreement over facts, and gloomy predictions 
about the prospects of implementation should a standard arise.  
Based on a series of interviews with participants in the process, including 
leading industry, civil society, and government voices, this Article identifies 
shortcomings in the Working Group process, including the absence of clear rules of 
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engagement, soft deadlines and a vague definition of deliverables, constrained 
chairs with little decision-making power, and potentially unbalanced 
representation.  
These shortcomings do not necessarily imply that multistakeholder processes 
are fundamentally flawed.  As a vehicle for self- or co-regulation, they should not 
be judged in a vacuum, but rather against alternative rulemaking processes.  Given 
the gridlock in Washington and Brussels, multistakeholder processes may yet bring 
more promise to policymaking in the privacy space than any tangible alternative.  
Moreover, this Article does not assert that every multistakeholder policymaking 
process is destined to end like DNT.  Some of the failings of the Working Group, 
such as unclear rules of representation, may be endemic to multistakeholder 
processes; others, such as pay-to-play obligations and a backchannel for discussion, 
may be more specific to the W3C, or even the alignment of forces within the 
Working Group.  
However, to avoid evident pitfalls, multistakeholder processes should: 1) be 
structured around manifest and achievable goals; 2) set forth clear procedures for 
voting, decision-making, and consensus; 3) devise rational, fair rules of 
representation, taking into account the relative costs and benefits and access to 
resources that various stakeholders have; 4) seek to coalesce around straw man 
documents as early as possible in the process; 5) empower a chair or editor to 
express decisions in writing; and 6) optimally operate under a backstop of formal 
rulemaking, which will reduce any incentive to stall.  In short, with firm structure 
and strong leadership, multistakeholder processes may perform better than 
evidenced by the W3C DNT Working Group. 
  
